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Introduction
In the 2014 Global Attitudes survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, people from the Middle East cited 'religious and ethnic hatred' as the most important global threat (Pew Research Center 2014) . Indeed, four years after the onset of the Arab uprisings, both Arab media and scholarly debates seem to have shifted significantly from the rhetoric of democratisation and social justice. Instead, sectarianism 1 and the accompanying high potential for violence have emerged as the dominant features of the post-2011 regional order (Hurd 2015; R. Khoury 2011; Venkat 2014; Bowen 2013) . Since the outbreak of the Syrian armed conflict and its spillovers, scholars have focused on sectarian identities, and particularly the Sunni-Shiite divide, as a driver of conflict (Abdo 2013a; Al-Rasheed 2011; Peri 2014b) . Rivalries, alliances, conflicts, and wars are increasingly framed in sectarian terms. This article examines the eruption of sectarianism in regional politics. It examines the process through which sectarian identities have emerged as security issues and a source of conflict.
While there is consensus that sectarianism takes centre stage in regional dynamics, there is significant disagreement on how to examine the role of sectarianism in regional conflicts. On the one hand, primordial approaches presume that sectarian identities, assumed to be natural, are the main driver of conflict. They consider primordial loyalties --such as sect and ethnicity --to be endemic, and the ensuing conflicts inevitable. On the other hand, the instrumental approach emphasizes the role of power politics, alliances, and material structures. It explains conflicts as being driven by regional rivalries and the exigencies of balance-of-power dynamics, viewing sectarian identities as tools open to manipulation and exploitation by political elites. The existing literature, which is divided between explanations of sectarianism as a given and accounts relying on structural factors, has proven limited in accounting for the mechanisms through which identities emerge as security issues in some cases and not others.
Inspired by securitisation theory, this article adopts a post-structuralist approach to examine how sectarian identities emerge as security threats. Securitisation theory is centred 1 In the Middle East, scholars draw on the concept of sectarianism as both a descriptive and analytical category to describe how religious cleavages politicize and become markers of conflict.
3 around the idea that security is constructed as a speech act, with threats brought into existence because they are uttered as such by securitising actors --for example, the state or political elites.
By portraying a sectarian Other as the source of an existential threat to a particular society, elites move the issue from normal politics to the 'exceptional', with extraordinary measures required to counter the source of the threat. Examining the role of sectarianism in regional conflicts involves examining how political elites use sectarian discourses as powerful sources of legitimation.
However, sectarian discourses are not merely manipulation or rhetoric; elites construct security issues by reiterating that certain sectarian identities are the source of existential threats. Instead of focusing on religious differences or the power-politics motives driving actors in conflict, securitisation theory focuses on how sectarian narratives are produced and reproduced while being tied to conflictual relations.
An emerging trend within securitisation theory has highlighted the fruitfulness of applying securitisation theory to the study of sectarianism in the Middle East (Malmvig 2015) .
This article builds on this approach and examines how sectarian identities --namely, the SunniShiite divide --have emerged as security threats in the Syria crisis. Initially, the Syria crisis was hardly sectarian in nature. Through sectarian discourses and practices, regional and domestic actors portrayed the existence of communities in accordance with sectarian identities. Sectarian narratives are no longer instruments of political legitimation; these narratives are employed to create a heightened sense of insecurity and are associated with the use of extraordinary military means. In this vein, this article examines the discourses and practices of Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia pertaining to their involvement in the Syria crisis. We show how both actors have constructed the 'sectarian other' as an existential threat. We also examine how these acts have been internalized by the masses and have facilitated the use of extraordinary politics.
Various factors have motivated our case study selection. Both Hezbollah and Saudi
Arabia have been central actors in contending axes --that is, the resistance axis and the so- Arabia, a regional power, has capitalized on the Sunni-Shiite divide to legitimize its intervention, Hezbollah, which treads more carefully within Lebanon's power-sharing setting, has used different sectarian nuances and overtones. More precisely, it has taken care to differentiate between Sunnis and Takfiris because it has had to argue its case within Lebanon's divided society. By drawing on a language that couples sectarian rhetoric with existential threats, the party has, however, positioned itself within the politics of sectarianism that Syria's conflict has heightened (Berti and Paris, 2014, 30) .
In addition, an inquiry into these two cases seeks to emancipate the study of sectarianism from those strands of the literature that focus on divided societies. Scholars have thoroughly studied sectarianism as an offshoot of heterogeneous societies. Such literature no longer captures the post-2011 dynamics in the Middle East which has witnessed the rise of 'regional sectarianism' (Philipps, 2014, 151) . Quasi-homogeneous states such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt have endorsed sectarian practices and discourses (Monier 2015) . Furthermore, nonstate actors have had to position themselves vis-à-vis the regional wave of sectarianism.
Accordingly, sectarianism is not necessarily a sociocultural phenomenon endemic to multisectarian societies. Examining the cases of Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia provides insights into how securitisation has influenced the emergence and consolidation of sectarianism at both domestic and regional levels in Middle East politics. It also traces post-2011 'securitised sectarianism' as a contextualized notion and practice, 2 embedded in specific constellations and inflections of power.
The article is structured as follows. First, we examine the existing literature on sectarianism in Middle Eastern international relations. We then present the main elements of 2 On the importance of contextualising the politics of securitisation, see Stritzel (2011) .
5 securitisation as a framework of analysis. Securitising sectarianism, we argue, starts as an explicit political decision whereby the political actor frames the external other as a menace through a repertoire of discursive and political practices. In this repertoire, domestic and regional security imperatives are closely interlinked. We draw on Saudi Arabia's and Hezbollah's interventions in the Syria crisis as revelatory cases. Afterwards, we discuss the broader theoretical implications of applying securitisation to the study of sectarianism in the Middle East.
Sectarianism in the Middle East: Primordialism versus Materialism
Sectarianism is an undeniable element of Middle East politics. Still, there is no scholarly agreement on how to approach it within regional conflicts. Scholars have conventionally framed sectarianism through the prism of intra-religious dynamics within divided societies (Dynes 1957) . In these societies, beliefs about religious differences evolve into boundary and conflict markers in polities' social stratification (Brewer 1992) . In the Middle East, sectarianism has been studied as a typical phenomenon of divided societies -such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain (Wehrey 2013; Matthiesen 2013b; Gengler 2013; Pinto 2014; Salamey 2009; Makdisi 1996; Amail 1985) .
Since the Islamic revolution in Iran, sectarianism has, however, emerged as a regional phenomenon that extends beyond divided societies. Sectarian identities at the regional level have been situated within the debates between primordialists (essentialists) and rationalists. The primordial approach emphasizes culture and identity as the determinants of conflict and cooperation among actors. The explosion of ethnic conflicts following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia led some scholars to draw correlations between communal and ethnic identities, on the one hand, and enmity and conflict, on the other (Horowitz 1995; Saideman 2001 ). In the Middle East, primordialists have analysed Sunni-Shiite identities as the core conflict dominating the region since the seventh century and still pertaining to current political dynamics (Nasr 2006; Betts 2013; Abdo 2013a) . Inspired by Huntington's (1993; famous argument about the clash of civilizations, according to which conflicts would erupt around cultural divides, some scholars argue that the 'clash' is within Islam (Sadiki 2014) .
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However, this approach fails to explain why sectarian identities remain peaceful at particular moments and become a source of conflict at others.
Rationalists have adopted an instrumentalist top-down approach, which derives from neorealism and Marxist structuralism in international relations theory. As the structure is constituted of the relative power distribution, identities are merely instruments manipulated to legitimize actors' material interests (e.g. Walt 1987; Kedourie 1992) . From this perspective, sectarian identities have emerged in regional politics as a prop of power in the region (Gause 2007; Wehrey et al. 2009; Lynch 2013; Gause 2014; Zubaida 2014; Berti and Paris 2014; Wehrey 2013) . Some scholars argue that regional actors have used sectarian discourses to legitimize their regimes in the face of the Arab uprisings (Al-Rasheed 2011; Guzansky and Berti 2013; Matthiesen 2013b) . Nevertheless, this top-down approach leaves many questions unanswered. It reduces identity dynamics to superstructures, and agency has a minimal influence on behaviour. This approach also does not explain the rise of sectarian identities among the pool of other identities available to political leaders, such as ethnic and tribal identities. In the remainder of this article, we revisit securitisation theory as a theoretical entry point for the study of sectarianism in the Middle East. We then apply securitisation as a theoretical lens with which to examine sectarian discourses and practices at the regional level in the context of the Syria crisis.
Securitisation: A Framework of Analysis
In the course of the 1990s, the realist strategies dominant in security studies were challenged by theoretical innovations that 'sociologized' the concept of security and took critical stances against the objective realities of world politics. Emerging from different methodological and ontological perspectives, these approaches offered reflective and dynamic debates on how to understand 'security'. One of the most important and controversial contributions to this debate was the idea of 'securitisation', a term advanced and developed by the Copenhagen School in IR.
The concept of 'securitisation' points to the process by which issues are transformed into security issues. The Copenhagen School considers security to be a constructed social phenomenon. Societies' sense of insecurity increases when their identities are perceived to be endangered.
Seen from this perspective, identities, including sectarian ones, can be a powerful tool with which to mobilize people or gain legitimacy. Therefore, actors politicize identities and portray these as facing an existential threat. This process of securitisation conforms to a broad constructivist approach, according to which security is a discursive construction rather than an objective reality. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003, 491 ) define securitisation as a successful 'speech act' 'through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat'. In other words, in order for an issue to be securitised, an actor, or the securitiser, presents and frames it as an existential threat, requiring the suspension of normal politics. Accordingly, the securitising act is 'not simply a realm of instrumental rationality and rhetorical manipulation' (Williams, 2003: 522) , but obligates and enables a subsequent behaviour to handle the securitised threat. In other words, it is an 'authoritative' discourse that mobilise a society in facing an existential threat. For securitisation to be attained, this 'securitising move' needs to be accepted by the 'audience' (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998; Waever 1995) . In other words, the securitisation process is an intersubjective process that requires an interaction between the securitiser and the audience.
Securitisation can be clarified by highlighting its three characteristics: securitisation is (1) a speech act that (2) presents a strategic act and is (3) accepted by the audience.
Securitisation starts as a conscious, explicit political act or 'speech act' that leaders undertake to make an issue into a security situation by representing it as such. As Waever (1995, 55) states, What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard 'security' as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering 'security' a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.
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Waever (1995, 54) adds that 'something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so'. In other words, securitisation is a political choice, a decision to conceptualize an issue in a particular way. There may be various reasons and motivations for framing an issue in security terms, such as political survival or the overcoming of an identity crisis. The Copenhagen School also limits the use of securitisation; it is limited to the constant repetition of a specific 'rhetoric of existential threat'. As Buzan et al. (1998, 26) argue,
The distinguishing feature of securitisation is a specific rhetorical structure […] That quality is the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as security an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to assess some objective threats that 'really' endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat.
Framing an issue as an existential threat also involves a second dimension, which relates to the policies adopted to handle the securitised threat. The securitising act is not limited to rhetorical manipulation; it also enables a subsequent behaviour to address the threat (Sjöstedt 2008, 10) . By framing an issue as an existential threat, political actors give it a sense of urgency that helps create sustained political support and enables the deployment of resources. Such measures might not be possible if these issues were regarded as matters of 'normal politics'. A securitiser not only urges that 'extraordinary measures' be taken, but also more or less disregards all institutionalized rules of conduct. However, the speech act or the framing of an issue as an existential threat is not a sufficient condition for the success of securitisation. The third dimension in this process is the audience's acceptance of these acts. As Buzan et al. (1998, 31) claim, 'whether an issue is a security issue is not something [securitisers] decide alone'.
Considering the above three dimensions, one can conclude that securitisation is an explicit speech act undertaken to securitise an issue by framing it as an existential threat. This securitising move is accompanied by strategies or measures to face this constructed threat. This securitising move cannot be successful unless it is accepted and approved by the audience -or, in other words, unless this subjective threat becomes intersubjective. We exemplify this 9 framework through our examination of the cases of Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia and the securitisation of sectarian discourses in the Syrian armed conflict.
Saudi Arabia
In March The Saudi Kingdom has often perceived the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis, or the so-called 'resistance axis', as a threat. This threat perception has been driven by the Kingdom's constant rivalry with Iran, which has involved ideological contestations and competing geopolitical interests (Wehrey et al. 2009 ). Scholars are often divided on the sources of this threat perception.
Some argue that the Saudi-Iranian competition is ideational (Rubin 2014; Mabon 2013; AdibMoghaddam 2006) . Others claim that identities are only instruments masking geopolitical rivalry over influence in the region, especially in the Gulf, Lebanon, and Iraq (Gause 2009 ). In this context, the Saudis have long attempted to isolate Iran from its allies (Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas). With the outbreak of the Syrian uprisings and the subsequent transformation of the unrest into civil war, the Saudi Kingdom saw an opportunity to finally break down this axis.
Moreover, it believed that weakening or toppling the al-Assad regime would undermine the popular appeal of the 'resistance axis'. As a Saudi official stated, 'Syria is Iran's entry into the Arab world […] take down al-Assad and you inflict a strategic blow on Iran' (quoted in K.
Sullivan 2012).
In 2011, the opportunity to change the balance of power unleashed sectarian ferment.
Whether the threat of the 'resistance axis' was real or imagined, sectarian identities emerged as 'playing with fire'. Although there has been no official sectarian discourse, the regime has tacitly endorsed it. For instance, it has done little to counter anti-Shiite fatwas issued by Salafi clerics (Wehrey et al. 2009, 27) . As Jones (2007) Just as the Syria crisis was hardly sectarian at the beginning, the motives driving the initial Saudi involvement in the conflict on the side of the opposition side were far from sectarian. By casting the Shiite Other as an existential threat to Sunni communities, the Saudi Kingdom allowed a discourse that constructed security issues around sectarian identities. The audience's internalisation of this discourse made this securitisation process successful in granting legitimacy to and gaining support for Saudi intervention in the Syria crisis. Furthermore, it led to significant charity donations beyond official channels in support of the Syrian rebels. The securitisation of sectarianism and its internalisation by the public goes beyond elites capabilities of controlling it, which makes any effort of de-securitisation defiant. During later stages in the conflict, the Saudi Kingdom shifted its alliances from supporting Sunni rebels to more secular ones. Becoming aware of the rise of extermism, the Kingdom also attempted to control the jihadis and charity money flowing to Syria. -Arabiya 2015) . This development shows that even though the Saudi elites initiated the securitisation of sectarianism through media discourses, they were unable to control its impact and reprecussions as it became internalised by the public.
Hezbollah
Despite the so-called 2012 'dissociation' policy or Baabda declaration which the Lebanese state 
Conclusions: Lessons on Securitisation in the Middle East and Beyond
This article has examined the sectarian dynamics within the international relations surrounding the Syria crisis through the lens of securitisation theory. We have examined the speech acts and practices underpinning Saudi Arabia's and Hezbollah's intervention in the conflict. When political actors deliberately construct sectarian identities as securitised issues, these discourses become inextricably linked to a dichotomized demarcation between the Self and the Other. 
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with securitisation theory requires us to consider why actors seek to securitise identities. It also allows us to delineate the argumentative power, mechanisms, and processes through which identities are transformed into security issues. In accordance with this viewpoint, our findings counter the assumption that sectarianism is an 'inescapable' characteristic of some societies.
Rather, we find that it can be a domestic and/or regional dynamic that 'waxes and wanes' in accordance with deliberate political actions and situational contexts. This framework could also inform the analysis of other cases in the region, such as the securitisation of the Sunni-Shiite divide in Bahrain and Yemen. Moreover, it could be transposed to examine intra-communal rifts within the Sunni community (e.g. Salafis versus the Muslim Brotherhood). Further, it could provide a theoretical entry point for studying the political struggle in Egypt and the portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat to the survival of the state and the stability of the region (cf. Malak 2014).
As securitisation is contributing to the scholarly debate on sectarianism in the international relations of the Middle East, empirical insights from the region are also contributing to the development of securitisation theory beyond its initially Western scope. The theory of securitisation was initially presented as a universal tool for the analysis of contemporary security processes. Its formulation and application remained confined to the security dynamics of Western and European historical experience, and many scholars considered it to be applicable only to liberal contexts. Despite the theory's European focus, some scholars have argued that insights from the Copenhagen School could be applied to non-democratic contexts through concept travelling, which implies adapting concepts without distorting their original meaning (Wilkinson 2007; Vuori 2008; Sheikh 2014; Malmvig 2014; Greenwood and Waever 2013; Yilmaz and Bilgin 2005) . Based on this view, this article has shown that the Middle East provides a rich pool of evidence with which to contribute to the development of securitisation theory and its applicability to non-European and non-democratic contexts. In particular, the securitisation of sectarianism in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah highlights three potential areas for future theory development.
First, securitisation theory focuses on cases where an issue is taken out of the 'normal politics' sphere, where democratic rules govern, and is transformed into 'special politics', where leaders can bypass democratic constraints through 'extraordinary measures'. The cases of Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia show that the narrow interpretation of 'extraordinary measures' poses a challenge. If 'extraordinary measures' in a democratic context are clear -for instance, the bypassing of normal decision-making process -the 'extraordinary' in non-or lessdemocratic contexts is still unclear. Some might argue that applying securitisation to nondemocratic contexts might be difficult because such contexts are constantly governed by 'special politics'; the regimes do not need legitimacy, which is substituted for by coercive mechanisms.
Hence, it becomes difficult to discern 'normal' from 'special politics'. Nevertheless, scholars have found that authoritarian regimes do care about legitimacy, because pure coercion does not exist and leaders require a minimum degree of consent and persuasive power (Alagappa 1995; Geddes 2005) . Our two empirical cases reveal that 'normal politics' in non-or less-democratic contexts are not related to democratic procedures, but rather to the social and historical structures within each society that impose constraints on political leaders. For instance, Hezbollah's special politics have focused on bypassing the power-sharing tradition in Lebanon. From this perspective, the challenging of such established structures can be considered 'special politics'.
Second, the role of the audience in the securitisation process remains both theoretically and empirically under-researched (Leonard and Kaunert 2011) . In a securitisation process, two actors are central: the securitiser (i.e. the actor who frames the issue as an existential threat) and the audience (i.e. the collective group to which the process of securitisation is directed).
Accordingly, securitisation is a shared understanding of what constitutes an existential threat.
Nevertheless, how this shared understanding is achieved remains unclear. Seen through its initial Western lens, securitisation theory implicitly assumes that audience acceptance is achieved through debate and free discussion. The cases investigated here show that audience approval can be achieved through a series of alternative methods that need to be further unpacked. Audience approval can be achieved through media manipulation or through the 'silence of the obedient', as the case of Saudi Arabia suggests. It can also be achieved through the attainment by one actor of an authoritative position in societal debates, as the case of Hezbollah reveals.
Third, the conception of the state presented in securitisation theory involves a logic that is based on a certain understanding of the state and society. Such an understanding is inextricably related to the history of state formation in Europe, or what Wilkinson (2007) terms the 'Westphalian straitjacket' of the Copenhagen School. According to this conception, societies are bound by the European understanding of identity, which is based on the nation state. National identity and citizenship overlap in this respect. From this perspective, Waever (1995, 67) distinguishes between threats to the society (nation) and those that endanger the state. Whereas the criterion for societal security is identity (national identity), state security is inextricably related to sovereignty. According to this understanding, society/nation is regarded as a whole, constituting one identity. The history of state formation in the Third World, and the Middle East in particular, has led to the emergence of states that are not necessarily congruent with national identities. 12 Middle Eastern states coexist alongside supranational identities, such as panArabism and pan-Islamism, and substate identities, such as tribal, ethnic, religious, and sectarian identities (Hinnebusch 2013) . To adapt securitisation theory to such contexts, we need to broaden the investigation of security dynamics beyond the state, looking at the securitisation processes pursued by both regimes and domestic forces considered to be non-state actors, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Future research ought to explore how securitisation theory can be adapted to account for those cases in which identity spillovers operate at domestic-regional nexuses.
Ultimately, the cases of Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah has examined the cases of securitisation of religious identities. Although Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia employed indirect and subtle sectarian narratives, the securitisation process was far reaching as people felt that their faith is under threat. Sectarianism in Middle East politics has the potential to contribute to the study of the securitisation religious dimensions beyond the Western tradition (Sheikh 2014) .
